



# Extending a Compiler Backend for Complete Memory Error Detection

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DRESDEN concept



WISSENSCHAFTSRAT





- 1. Motivation
- 2. Error detection, AN encoding
- 3. The extended compiler backend
- 4. Evaluation
- 5. Summary







#### 1. Motivation

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#### 4

#### **Motivation**

□ Frequency of transient HW faults (aka. soft errors) is increasing.

- Traditional cause of faults: cosmic rays.
- Vulnerability is increasing due to smaller feature sizes and lower operating voltages.
- Dark/dim silicon in memory modules:
  - Extended refresh cycles for DRAM.
  - Lower supply voltage for SRAM.

S. Borkar, "Designing reliable systems from unreliable components: ...," IEEE Micro, vol. 25, no. 6, 2005.

OMPILER

CONSTRUCTION

- □ Memory errors: ECC memory modules have their limitations.
  - Typically SEC-DED codes (single error correction, double error detection).
  - Large fractions of memory errors cannot be handled by SEC-DED codes (Hwang et al., ASPLOS 2012).


for energy

efficiency

ECC not necessarily extended to the entire memory hierarchy. (Load-store queues?)

Software-implemented error detection has the flexibility to detect also complex error patterns.

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


### Software-implemented error detection



- □ Manual incorporation of integrity checks.
  - Laborious and cumbersome.
  - Mixes functional and non-functional requirements.
  - **x** Requires expert knowledge.
  - × Error detection limited to anticipated errors.
- Automated, disciplined approaches.
  - Enable comprehensive error detection.
  - Source-to-source transformation.
  - Aspects.
  - Compiler-based approaches:
    - Transformation of machine code.
    - Transformation of intermediate representation (IR).

popular in the late 90s and early 2000s



<pre>check(a0, a1);</pre>
•••
var0 = a0 + b0;
var1 = a1 + b1;
<pre>check(var0, var1);</pre>
r0 = c0 * var0;
r1 = c1 * var1;
<pre>check(r0, r1);</pre>

increasingly popular since the advent of the LLVM framework

gives access to sophisticated program analysis

### Limitations of software-implemented error detection



var = a + b; r = c \* var;

```
check(a0, a1);
...
var0 = a0 + b0;
var1 = a1 + b1;
check(var0, var1);
...
r0 = c0 * var0;
r1 = c1 * var1;
check(r0, r1);
```

- □ To detect errors in memory ...
  - Which variables are kept in memory?
  - When are variables kept in memory?
  - Are there any hidden variables that are put into memory?

Ultimately, the compiler

knows all this ...


100

... but only very late!

Percentage of dynamic memory accesses (loads) that are present in the program IR or inserted by the compiler backend:

(Twelve test programs, labeled A-L.)

In some cases (H, L) virtually all loads are inserted by the compiler backend!










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### Memory error detection by DMR



- DMR (dual modular redundancy).
  - □ In the context of software-implemented error detection: duplication of data.



- DMR may introduce race conditions in multi-threaded applications.
  - State-of-the-art work usually assumes memory is protected by ECC (in hardware).



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#### AN encoding introduces large overheads if used to protect operations: several 10x-100x.


#### A = 58659 is known to have good properties; can detect up to 5 bit flips, Hoffmann et al., 2015.

**AN** encoding

AN encoding:

- - - Generally, multi-bit errors can be detected by suitable A.
- Error-detecting capability varies with the constant A.








COMPILER

CONSTRUCTION

### Memory error detection by AN encoding (1)



□ Apply AN encoding only to values stored to memory  $\rightarrow$  low overhead due to AN encoding.

#### encode before storing:

%01 = mul i64 %00, A store i64 %01, i64\* %p

- □ AN encoding is applied at the LLVM IR level.
  - Common approach in software-implemented fault tolerance schemes.

#### check and decode after loading:


Error detection at the IR level misses memory accesses that are inserted by the compiler backend.






### Memory error detection by AN encoding (2)





- Backend for the C programming language inserts memory accesses for:
  - Register spills (*spill*).
  - □ Callee-saved registers (csr). ■
  - □ Frame pointer (*fptr*).
  - Return address (return).
  - Function arguments (arg).
  - Jump tables (*jt*).

implement function calls









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


### The extended compiler backend




- Backend for the C programming language inserts memory accesses for:
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  - Return address (return).
  - □ Function arguments (arg).
  - Jump tables (jt).

- Implement error detection in the compiler backend by DMR:
  - □ Faster than AN encoding.
  - □ Keeps function calls efficient.
  - □ Adds (almost) no register pressure.
- Duplicated store/load:
  - Additional memory accesses are "cheap".
  - Memory locations already in the cache.
  - (All) memory accesses are thread-local.



### **DMR for register spills**






- $\Box$  Comparison memory/register is specific to x86 more generally, CISC machines.
- □ RISC machines?  $\rightarrow$  cmp mem/reg might be sensible ISA extension.



## **DMR for function arguments**





- Requires co-operation between caller and callee (modified calling convention).
- Library calls still work. (Caller can ignore duplicated arguments).
- □ The number of arguments passed on the stack may be low (depending on the architecture).




### DMR for the return address



CHAIRFOR


COMPILER

CONSTRUCTION



#### caller:

0x804a99e: mov 0x804a9a8, ebx 0x804a9a3: call <foo> 0x804a9a8: ...



- □ Modified calling convention: pass return address in register ebx.
- □ No modification required on, e.g., ARM or MIPS.





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### **Fault injection**



#### □ Assumptions:

- Only a single fault affect program execution.
- Only single bit flips occurs.

Commonly justified by the rarity of faults. (SEU – single event upset)


- □ Simulate symptoms of faults by ...
  - ... flipping a bit in a memory location that is loaded from.
- □ Perform exhaustive fault injections:
  - Flip a bit in all possible locations in all loads from memory

letter	test case
Α	array reduction
В	bubblesort
с	CRC-32
D	DES encryption
E	Dijkstra (shortest path)
F	expression evaluation
G	token lexer
н	expression parser
I	matrix multiplication
J	array copy
К	quicksort
L	switch




### Full memory error detection





#### no error detection:



#### AN encoding and DMR in the backend:




#### **Runtime overhead**




Slow down dominated

by register spills.



#### Subset of SPEC CINT2006:









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- Automatic code transformation that introduced memory error detection not comprehensive when applied above the level of machine code.
  - Transformations at the level of source code or IR desirable for productivity.
- Supporting memory error detection with DMR introduced by the compiler backend ...
  - ... leads to full memory error detection,
  - □ ... incurs a runtime overhead of
    - 1.50 on i386 (SPEC CINT2006),
    - 1.13 on x86\_64 (SPEC CINT 2006).
- □ Absence of vulnerabilities introduced by the compiler backend required for ...
  - ... (reliable analysis/evaluation of) relaxed fault tolerance schemes.
  - ... applications with strict safety and reliability requirements.
- □ The stack has been found a major weakness.





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Thank you.

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